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1. Introduction 
The Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) implemented with the help of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and The World Bank in the stagnating economies of Latin America in the 1980s, 
and in general have been a subject of scholarly debate for decades. The influence on economic 
growth, poverty and inequality1 has been the main focus of studies, but these policies have also been 
criticized for their consequences on public health, corruption and the environment. When examining 
the studies on the relationship between structural adjustment and inequality, SAPs are often 
criticized for their conditions and consequences which increased levels of inequality. How these 
policies associated with neoliberal ideology influence inequality is explained, which is endorsed by an 
increasing unequal distribution of income in this period. However, inequality is a complex 
phenomenon caused by various interrelated factors that differ in consequences. In Latin America for 
example, the structure of the post-war economy and the recession that preceded reform might have 
played a major role in the development of the distribution of income in the 1980s.  
This research aims to examine whether SAPs were indeed the main cause of rising levels of inequality 
in this region. It will do so by testing the claims from the literature on structural adjustment through 
an examination of the identified causes of inequality in case studies on this subject in Latin America. 
If the abovementioned theoretical literature is correct, the results of these empirical case studies, 
wherein the complexity of the causes of inequality can be thoroughly described, will state that SAPs 
are in fact responsible for rising levels of inequality in this period. As such, this dissertation aims to 
answer the research question: Are Structural Adjustment Programs identified as the primary causes 
of rising levels of economic inequality between 1980 and 2000 in conducted case studies in Latin 
America?  
In the next chapter, the nature of structural adjustment will be clarified. In the third chapter, the 
theoretical framework wherein SAPs are perceived as the cause of inequality in Latin America will be 
described. In the fourth chapter, the method of analyses will be explained. In the fifth chapter, the 
examined case studies will be presented. In the final chapter, these findings will be discussed and the 
conclusion will be presented.   
 
 
                                                          
1
 Inequality and economic inequality are used interchangeably in this dissertation. As economic inequality in 
general is examined, both income and wealth will be included in this research. However, most of the literature 
used will refer to the distribution of income.  
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2.Structural Adjustment Programs 
Bulmer-Thomas (2014) provides a qualitative overview of the economic history of Latin America. In 
the early 1980s the region underwent a severe economic crisis, predominantly caused by 
unmanageable amounts of debt, and stagnating and inefficient economies. Unable to pay their 
government debts and realizing the problems related to their economy based on Import Institution 
Industrialization (ISI), the countries in Latin America sought financial help at international creditors 
such as the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). International banks in America and Europe had 
such a high level of exposure to Latin American debts that their financial viability was perceived to be 
at risk. Worried that their interest might be at stake, the governments of advanced economies acted 
determined to reform the Latin American economies in such a way that economic performance 
would be improved and debt could be managed again. With active involvement of the Reagan 
administration, governments, banks, creditors (bilateral and multilateral) and debtor countries had 
frequent formal and informal meetings and set up a common set of principles guiding the economies 
back to a healthy performance. The IFIs had a particular important role in this process, and initiated a 
new type of program that became pivotal in these reforms: the Structural Adjustment Programs. 
(Bulmer-Thomas, 2014) 
Structural Adjustment Programs are policy instruments designed by The World Bank in reaction to 
economic problems developing countries faced due to the economic/oil crisis of the 1980s (Easterly, 
2005). The main objective of these programs was to adjust balance of payments problems while 
maintaining growth. The IMF had a history of conditioned loans before this period, but Easterly 
explains that after 1980 the fund changed the nature of these lending facilities by expanding the 
number and maternity of the loans and by cooperating more intensively with The World Bank. These 
programs consist of conditions that countries have to comply with in order to obtain a loan from the 
IFIs. Typical conditions include currency devaluation, reduction of the government budget through 
higher taxes and lowered spending, liberalization of the domestic markets and privatization of state 
enterprises, but the implemented policies vary from case to case (Lensink, 1996).  
Samuel Morley (1995) has described how SAPs became notorious measures that were implemented 
in Latin America during and after its debt crisis. His book on the impact of adjustment in Latin 
America provides an extensive and detailed overview of reform processes and their consequences in 
the region. Although the countries adjusted some of the inherent problems of the ISI economies 
predominately found in Latin-America, the backlash of crisis and reform had severe social 
consequences. The IFIs had been active in these regions before, providing short-term loans to 
countries with problems related to government debt, inflation and economic performance, but these 
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loans differed from to new SAPs. Structural adjustment programs and loans were a first in macro-
economic adjustment at such a fundamental scale, influencing the economy at the most basic level 
(Morley, 1995).  
The SAPs that will be examined in this study will be both from the IMF and The World Bank. Any 
Structural Adjustment Loan or Credit Project from the World Bank will qualify as an SAP. The IMF 
facilities are a little more complicated. Oberdabernig’s (2000) research of the influence of IMF SAPs 
on poverty and income distribution offers a useful guide to the different programs of the IMF. The 
programs researched in this study include Stand-By Arrangements and Extended Fund Facilities.2 
Oberdabernig (2000, p.2) states:  
‘’Stand-By Arrangements (SBA) are generally shorter term agreements which last typically 
one to two years and imply higher conditionality. They are designed to help countries with 
more severe disequilibria to address short-term balance of payment problems. The greatest 
amount of IMF resources was provided under SBAs.  
The Extended Fund Facility (EFF) was established to help countries with severe disequilibria to 
address longer-term balance of payment problems which require fundamental economic 
reforms. The typical EFF program usually lasts three years.’’ 
As these projects of the IMF and the World Bank differ in size and nature not only as a type, but also 
as the same type between different countries, comparative research is difficult. 3 However, these 
loans, the conditionality’s attached and the consequences are often so intertwined that separated 
analysis in almost impossible. When one tries to assess the causes of inequality in Latin America with 
a focus on the role of SAPs, examining only one of the IFIs SAPs would mean ignoring a very 
significant section of the studied phenomena. So while acknowledging some limitations, this paper 
will study both the IFIs SAPs.       
3. Theoretical Framework 
In this chapter, the ideological debate and general theoretical framework on structural adjustment 
will be presented first. In the second section, the specific relationship between SAPs and inequality as 
described in the scholarly literature will be examined. In the third section, the complexity of the 
                                                          
2
 The Structural Adjustment Facility, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, and the Poverty Reduction 
and Growth Facility would also qualify as SAPs, but were not implemented in Latin America in the covered 
period between 1980-2000.  
3
 Edwin Truman (2001)  formulated a critique towards a research of  Easterly on all sorts of SAPs by naming it a 
comparison of apples, oranges and six other types of food.  
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relationship between SAPs and poverty will be described, and how this observation shows that there 
is a need to review the validity of the framework of section two.      
3.1 General framework on neoliberalism and 
structural adjustment 
Ever since the introduction of SAPs, both the nature and the consequences of these policies have 
been debated. Crisp and Kelly (199) explain in their data analysis on the socioeconomic 
consequences of SAPs that the proponents of structural adjustment claim that enormous debt 
burdens have been reduced, rapid inflation has been curbed and overall economic performance 
generally has been sound since reform. This, as opposed to the dramatic recession that Latin America 
encountered in the early 1980’s, can be seen as a spectacular improvement. This crisis is perceived as 
proof that the paradigm of a statist economy that had been dominant in the region for decades had 
fundamental flaws. The crisis that the countries faced was the consequence of this flawed structure, 
and the IFIs policies, although painful, repaired these economies. However, opposing voices tell the 
narrative that these reforms have had severe social consequences which especially hurt the poorest, 
lack a ‘’human face’’ and have paved the path towards an American style of ‘’casino-capitalism’’. 
Although the interventionist economies might not have been perfect, these authors claim that the 
neoliberal cure has been worse than the initial economic disease. At the time, the former narrative 
was dominant in the IFI’s, government, private sector and among academics. Any remaining voices 
defending a more interventionist state and debt relief by creditors were overwhelmed. Seemingly 
with no possible alternative, almost every Latin American country sought help through structural 
adjustment lending. (Crisp & Kelly, 1999) As this paper will derive a hypothesis from the critical4 
narrative, this side of the scholarly literature will be examined more thoroughly in the following 
section.  
John Williamson was one of the first scholars to describe the neoliberal culture of the IFIs and coined 
the popular term ‘’the Washington Consensus’’. Williamson (1990) identified 10 neoliberal principles 
that were recurring in most forms of policy of the IFIs that were tacitly agreed upon and although 
debated in scholarly and popular literature, were not under discussion within the IFIs. Neoliberalism 
and its proponents, both scholars such as Friedman and Hayek and politicians such as Reagan and 
Thatcher, dominated the economic debate at the time and these neoliberal principles formed the 
foundation for policies like the SAPs.  Ever since Williamson’s essay scholars have examined, 
                                                          
4
 The narrative or theoretical framework that criticizes SAPs on its efficiency, effectiveness or socio-economic 
consequences is referred to as ‘’critical’’ in this dissertation. This is distinct from other scholarly uses of the 
word ‘’critical’’, such as ‘’critical theory’’ as in the theoretical framework associated with Robert Cox 
(Moolakkatuu, 2009).  
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researched and sometimes criticized the neoliberal principles of the Washington Consensus and 
structural adjustment in particular.  
The study of Argawel and Sengupta (1999) on the effects of SAPs on economic performance, its main 
target, offers some insight on this context. They have researched whether SAPs in 1980 have led to 
better overall economic performance at the time of writing. They describe how the crises and 
reforms combined (the influence of both processes are hard to separate) of the Latin American 
countries caused falling GDP per capita, curtailed investment, and increased debt to GDP ratio’s in 
the 1980s. In general, surpluses on the trade account only seemed to be caused by decreasing 
imports, not by the aimed increasing exports. Furthermore, they state that past experiences prove 
that to grow out of solvability problems, a country needs both significant economic growth and debt 
relief. As the Latin American crisis was perceived a liquidity problem, neither was achieved. In the 
1990s however, Argawel and Sengupta identify more positive developments. Especially after 1994, 
they find that generally the countries achieved higher rates of economic growth, curbed extreme 
inflation and by boosting export rates they improved their trade account. Only debt reduction was 
not achieved properly, as debt to GDP ratios decreased only marginally. They conclude that in 
general reforms in the 1980s have led to economic growth in the 1990s, although they call into 
question whether this growth was optimal and sustainable.  
 3.2 SAPs and Inequality 
There is a vast amount of literature on the relationship between structural adjustment and 
inequality.5 Garuda (2000) presents a good overview of these theoretical linkages between neoliberal 
reforms and inequality, derived from an extensive collection of sources. Although the focus of its 
study is on IMF programs, many of these linkages probably also apply for SAPs of The World Bank. 
Garuda identifies four primary mechanisms how fund programs can have an impact on inequality 
(both negative and positive): currency devaluation, reductions in the budget deficit, changes in 
growth rates and changes in income rates.  
- Currency devaluation as condition in programs is used to decrease the price ratio of non-
tradable goods to tradable goods, which can promote exports. However, urban consumers 
                                                          
5
 For an illustrating selection of literature on the subject, see for example SAPRIN (2004), a report composed by 
various international organizations on the consequences of structural adjustment and how it caused poverty 
and inequality;  Simon et al. (1995) who have assessed the effects of SAPs on highly-indebted Sub-Saharan 
countries in a framework of ‘’underdevelopment’’; Pieper and Taylor (1996) their essay on how the IFIs came to 
dominate economic policy and how this influences economic policies worldwide and Lazzarato (2009) who 
describes how the rise of neoliberalism has made individualization, competition and inequality main values of 
(American) society.  
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facing higher food prices and rural farmers producing for domestic production often get set 
back financially by this measure. 
- Austerity as a condition in SAPs does not have to worsen the distribution of income, but 
Garuda claims that in general those in low income households are the most targeted group 
and suffer the most in economic terms due to taxation and austerity. This causes a rise in 
economic inequality. In developing countries where the interest of the economic and 
political elite are usually more aligned, this proves to be especially true according to Garuda.  
- Non-inclusive growth caused by SAPs can influence inequality. Garuda supports this 
statement with an analysis of the development of job growth in manufacturing and 
agriculture. IMF programs, which severely increase unemployment for manufacturers or 
rural farmers despite renewed economic growth, can immensely increase inequality, as 
critics of a fund programs in Indonesia point out (Garuda, 2000).    
- Finally, curbed inflation following imposed policies usually has a positive effect on the 
distribution of income. Inflation hurts urban workers paid in cash the most, as the lag in their 
salaries as opposed to changes of commodity and food prices hurts their real income. 
Wealthy individuals and enterprises can protect themselves by buying (foreign) assets 
protected from domestic inflation. As IMF programs have an overall good record of 
decreasing massive inflation, they can reduce inequality in this manner.  
Garuda presents these mechanisms without an overall conclusion; the relative weight and exact 
nature of the reforms determines the actual influence. Oberdabernig’s (2010) enumeration of 
possible mechanisms of SAPs that influence inequality and poverty includes Garudas four points 
(although they differ in exact conceptualization) and adds two other mechanisms: trade and 
financial liberalization.  
- Trade liberalization, as a condition of SAPs, is likely to have two contrary effects. First, 
formerly protected sectors will contract and will lower income for the households involved. 
As SAPs can have a tremendous impact on domestic industries employing many low-skilled 
workers, this might have skewed inequality. However, growing agricultural and industrial 
sectors that are competitive might raise the incomes of poor households active in this sector, 
what can level the distribution of income. Whether the overall effect of trade liberalization is 
positively or negatively related to inequality depends on the relative size of both the 
competitive and protected sectors in a country.  
- Financial liberalization, as a condition of SAPs, which aims to enlarge capital markets in 
developing countries can be linked to weakness in the banking sector according to 
Oberdabernig, which can lead to financial crisis. Without proper regulation and sound 
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economic policy, liberalization of the financial sector can indirectly greatly affect the 
distribution of income and well-being of the poor. An orthodox neoliberal would however 
oppose this claim by stating that financial liberalization causes a more effective allocation of 
capital, which enhances economic growth.  
The presumed relationship between SAPs and inequality will be based on these six mechanisms in 
this dissertation.  
 3.3 Complexity in explaining poverty 
In literature on poverty and economic growth authors tend to emphasize the complexity of the 
interdependent relationships between these phenomena. To illustrate this emphasis on complexity; 
Easterly’s (2003) conclusions based on an empirical study on poverty and growth are mixed. He finds 
that countries that reform under SAPs perform worse in lowering levels of poverty then countries 
that did not, at least during an economic expansion. At the same time, the level of poverty increases 
less dramatically during an economic crisis in program countries in comparison to non-program 
countries. Bulmer-Thomas (2014) observes an increase in poverty rates in the 1990s, which was the 
opposite of the initial prediction of proponents of the neoliberal economy, but a sharp decline after 
2000. Although some of this poverty reduction might have been related to the better economic 
performance due to reforms, Bulmer-Thomas credits targeted social spending primarily for this 
reduction. Oberdabernig (2010) concludes a statistical analysis by stating that SAPs in general have a 
negative impact on poverty in a country, but Latin America as region is an exception to this.  
In contrast to some of the critical literature that claims that structural adjustment definitely increases 
inequality, the causes and consequences of poverty as described above seem to be very complex. It 
is unlikely that these two very interrelated phenomena differ to such an extent in complexity, so one 
might expect that some authors on inequality might have left out some nuances. This observance 
indicates the need for a validity check of this critical theoretical framework. This dissertation is based 
on this need.    
4.Method of analysis 
4.1 Hypotheses 
In order to check the validity of the critical framework, the general hypothesis derived from this 
framework ‘’SAPs have been a major factor in the increase of inequality in Latin America between 
1980 and 2000’’ will be tested. As this hypothesis is very broad, it will be deconstructed in multiple, 
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manageable subhypotheses. These subhypotheses will be based on the six theoretical linkages 
between SAPs and inequality described in section 3.3. Conversion of these mechanisms into 
hypotheses results in: 
Subhypothesis 1:  Currency devaluation implemented through SAPs increases inequality. 
Subhypothesis 2: Austerity implemented through SAPs increases inequality.  
Subhypothesis 3: Growth following structural adjustment is not inclusive, thereby causing inequality.  
Subhypothesis 4: Curbed inflation following structural adjustment decreases inequality.  
Subhypothesis 5: Trade liberalization implemented through SAPs can both increase and decrease 
inequality.  
Subhypothesis 6: Financial liberalization implemented through SAPs increases inequality 
How this research will be designed in order to test these subhypotheses will be explained in the next 
section. 
 4.2 General delimitation 
This study will focus on the SAPs that were initiated between 1980 and 1999. This period is selected 
because although there had been conditional lending by the IFI’s before 1980, the new framework of 
structural adjustment was not introduced until 1980 (Easterly, 2005). Cases after 1999 will not be 
examined because in this year Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers were introduced that focus on the 
alleviation of poverty within the IMF lending framework. This year marks (approximately) the 
beginning of the Post-Washington consensus, a phrase coined by Joseph Stiglitz, economist at World 
Bank at the time (Stiglitz, 1999). This was related to a changing attitude towards the role of the state, 
liberalization and the role of poverty in lending programs of the IFIs. This can be seen as a general 
reinterpretation of economic liberalism in the IFIs and might have significantly altered the nature and 
effects of programs. So in order to analyze the effects the initial policies that have been criticized in 
the presented literature, the cases and the developments of inequality levels after 1999 are excluded. 
In addition to this, most of the reviewed literature does not cover the period after 2000.  
Latin America is chosen because of the limited scope of this study and the extensive literature of the 
subject in this region, which is probably related to extensive involvement of the IFIs in the 1980s due 
to the Latin American debt crisis and the exceptionally high rates of social and economic inequality in 
the region. This study can contribute to this literature by validating (or questioning) the quality of the 
claims made. Information about SAP in other regions such as Eastern Europe and Africa would enrich 
this study, but would produce an amount of data and literature that is too large for this dissertation 
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to manage. Further research in these other regions is needed and might produce revealing insights in 
the workings of SAPs in a different context.   
4.3 A literature review of case studies 
A selection of countries will be made that underwent adjustment reforms in the 1980, and a thick 
description based on existing scholarly will be given on each case. The literature reviewed will be 
presented, and in addition to this information about the economic development of the countries in 
this period and specific data about the SAPs, inequality, growth and inflation will be presented for 
each case. These elements will be used in the sixth chapter to test the hypothesis. A case selection 
will be made on the basis of a Most Different Systems Design (MDSD) (Bryman, 2012), as the cases 
vary too much for a Most Similar Systems Design comparison. The cases will have to be selected in 
such a way that the relevant factors influencing inequality differ at maximum and the only 
commonality is the process of structural adjustment.  One could argue that (almost) every Latin 
American country has to be seen as an independent case due to the differences in both the 
background and the form of structural adjustment, and the generalized outcomes do not apply to 
cases that were not included. There is some reason in this point, but as this research will have a 
limited scope, it will aim to generalize findings to the region of Latin America by the means of a 
proper case selection nonetheless.     
The cases that will be researched are Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica and Venezuela. The selection is 
primarily made on the basis of GDP per capita, the history of economic growth, levels of inequality, 
geography and population in order to provide a variety of socio-economic contexts wherein SAPs 
were implemented.  The absence of literature on individual cases also has excluded some 
possibilities, e.g. small island states. Data from The World Bank (2016) illustrate these differences. 
Chile has a relative high GDP per capita, Costa Rica and Venezuela a little lower and Bolivia much 
lower than this. The economic growth of Chile and Costa Rica has been high and stable since 1980, 
while Bolivia and Venezuela have performed more modestly and have been more unstable 
economically. Bolivia and Chile are relatively unequal as measured by the GINI index6, and Costa Rica 
and Venezuela have been relatively equal (up until 2000). Furthermore, Edwards (1995) his 
assessment of reforms in the region grades the success of implementation of reforms in Chile with an 
1,67, Bolivia with an 1,20, Costa Rica with a 0,40, and Venezuela with a 0,00 on a scale from 0 to 2.   
Venezuela is located at the Atlantic Ocean, Chile at the Pacific, Costa Rica at both oceans and Bolivia 
                                                          
6
 The GINI Index, or coefficient, is a statistical measure by which the distribution of income of a population can 
be represented. This will be the primary statistic whereby inequality will be measured in this research. The 
value can vary from 0, wherein everyone’s income is equal, and 1, wherein one person has everything.  
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is landlocked. Finally, Venezuela, Chile, Bolivia and Costa Rica differ in terms of population, with 
approximately 15, 11, 5,5 and 2,4 million inhabitants in 1980, respectively (World Bank, 2016). As 
such, within the region these cases differ tremendously in socio-economic terms. If SAPs are indeed 
policies that inherently cause rising levels of inequality, this process will be identified by the 
examined literature despite these substantial different circumstances.  
A subhypothesis is considered confirmed and deemed generalizable if it is perceived in two cases as 
an important factor influencing inequality. Four of the six subhypotheses state that SAPs cause 
inequality, one of them claims SAPs decrease it, and one states it depends on the circumstance. As 
each of the mechanisms can differ in its relative influence, it is difficult to establish the exact point 
from whereon the general hypothesis can be considered as confirmed.  In any case, the ‘’negative’’ 
mechanisms need to be identified as significant factors causing inequality in the literature. Although 
it is not necessary that each of the subhypotheses are identified in every case to confirm the general 
hypothesis, three of the four subhypotheses need to be evaluated as decisive factors that caused 
rising economic inequality in three of the four cases. In that case, the general hypothesis is 
considered confirmed. Alternatively, if ‘’positive’’ mechanisms (inflation and possibly trade 
liberalization) caused by SAPs are identified as decisive factors promoting equity during periods when 
inequality is declining, or if the results are inconclusive or ambiguous, the general hypothesis will be 
rejected.        
5. Cases 
5.1 Bolivia 
Table 1: Overview SAPs   
Year IMF Loans WB Loans 
 (In Thousands of 
SDRs)  
(In millions of US 
$)  
1980 
1986 
1988 
1991 
1998 
66,38 (SBA) 
107,60 (2 SBAs) 
163,26 (EFF) 
  
100,96 (EFF  
50.0 (SALP) 
  
  
70.9 (SACP)  
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Graph 1: Overview Inflation Bolivia7 
   
Graph 2: Overview GDP per capita growth Bolivia 
 
Graph 3: Overview GINI index Bolivia  
                                                          
7
 Due to hyperinflation, in Bolivia and Chile the graphs on inflation are logarithmic. 
1
10
100
1000
10000
100000
1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998
Inflation 
 
 
Inflation,
consumer
prices
(annual %)
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998
Growth 
 
 
GDP per
capita
growth
(annual %)
12 
 
 
Sources:  
GINI 1986 & 1989: Lustig (1995)  
GINI 1997 & 1999: UNU-WIDER (2015) 
Inflation & GDP growth: The World Bank (2016b) 
IMF Loans: International Monetary Fund (2016) 
WB Loans: The World Bank (2016a) 
 
In Bolivia, the IMF facilitated a total of four loans between 1980 and 1999, of which one was covered 
by the EFF and three by the SBA. The World Bank was active in the country by providing one 
Structural Adjustment Loan Project in 1980 and one Structural Adjustment Credit Project in 1991. 
Data on inequality is scarce and varies between different sources, so these trends need to be 
identified through secondary sources.   
The most detailed and complete account of the development of inequality in Bolivia in this period 
comes from Thiele (2003). Thiele researched the consequences of the structural adjustment policies 
in Bolivia. He builds on the existing literature that evaluated the SAPs in Bolivia as successful in terms 
of providing macroeconomic stability and growth, and complements this by providing an account of 
the social developments. He distinguishes two periods after the introduction of structural adjustment 
following the Bolivian economic crisis of 1985. First, the economic reforms implemented curbed 
hyperinflation that was inflicting major economic damage on the country, which enabled economic 
recovery. From this point onwards, the development of inequality becomes more complex. Although 
it can be said that the general trend was towards more equality in the 1990s, Thiele concludes that 
there seems to be no clear long-term trend in the development of inequality since then. Furthermore, 
he describes some factors behind the development of inequality in Bolivia since 1990. He states that 
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differences in competiveness of various industries and the lack of competitiveness of the agricultural 
sector at a regional level due to mediocre devaluation were important factors. Secondly, the increase 
in income of white-collar workers has exceeded that of blue-collar workers and those working in the 
informal sector.  Lastly, social spending is seen as an import factor influencing inequality. Due to the 
absence of cuts in spending, the increase of inequality was only moderate. Thiele concludes his 
examination by stating that given the success of stabilization and economic growth in Bolivia, 
additional efforts to reduce inequality and poverty only have been moderately successful. 
Vargas (2012) has examined the declining level of inequality in Bolivia since 2000. His results suggests 
that long-term improvements in education have contributed more than anything else to the 
reduction of inequality, and sources of inequality can be mostly attributed to differences in human 
capital. Although these findings are interesting and are accounted for, the ceasing of 
implementations of SAPs since 2003 make it difficult to assess whether this is a long-term 
consequence of structural adjustment or, on the contrary, caused by the withdrawal of the policies. 
5.2 Chile  
Table 2: Overview SAPs Chile 
Year IMF Loans WB Loans 
 (In Thousands of 
SDRs)  
(In millions of US 
$)  
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1988 
500,00 (SBA) 
 
825,00 (EFF) 
   
64,00 (EFF) 
 
250.0 (SALP) 
250.0 (SALP) 
250.0 (SALP)  
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Graph 4: Overview Inflation Chile 
 
Graph 5: Overview GDP per capita growth Chile 
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Graph 6: Overview GINI Index growth Chile 
 
Sources:  
GINI Indexes: UNU-WIDER (2015) 
Inflation & GDP growth: The World Bank (2016b) 
IMF Loans: International Monetary Fund (2016) 
WB Loans: The World Bank (2016a) 
 
Chile underwent three SALPs, in 1985, 1986, and 1987, under auspices of the World Bank. 
Furthermore, between 198w and 1988 the country received 3 loans from the IMF, of which 2 SBAs 
and one EFF. The overview of the country’s GINI indexes indicates that levels of inequality have been 
stable at a level between 0.50 and 0.55 in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Davis-Hamel (2012) his examination of the reforms in Chile provides an overview of its period of 
adjustment. Chile was the first Latin American country that encountered a recession caused by its ISI 
modeled economy in 1973, which caused a military coup installing the autocratic Pinochet regime. 
This regime restructured the economy (mostly independent from the IFIs) following an extremely 
orthodox neoliberal model, which boosted enormous economic growth up until 1982, but resulted in 
anther economic recession in 1982. The economy recovered again during newly initiated reforms 
under auspices of the IFIs. However, 10 years of crisis and reform had concentrated wealth into a 
very select group and left a significant part of the population poor and unemployed. Mass protest 
among other things triggered the Pinochet regime to hold an election, and in 1990 the newly elected 
government focused on ‘’growth with equity’’. By a literature review and data collection Davis-Hamel 
finds that deviation from the orthodox model was crucial in improving socio-economic conditions.    
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Raczynski and Romaguerra (1995) have made a major contribution to the literature on Chile with a 
detailed description of the consequences of crisis and austerity in Chile and its relation to inequality, 
backed with substantial amounts of data. Like the crisis and process of reform itself, their conclusion 
is complex and ambiguous. Where a normal analysis of a period of crisis and reform is difficult due to 
different factors that are interrelated and working at the same time, the analysis of Chile is even 
more complex due to two crises (where the former might have caused the later), different forms of 
government and economic policy, and spectacular growth which was alternated by recession. Some 
notable findings of this research will be presented. First, they find that moderate, stable economic 
growth on the long-term is far better than booms and busts as in the Chilean experience for the 
middle and lower class of a society. Recession harms the wealth and income of these groups, but 
economic expansion does not guarantee an opposite development, at least not immediately. The 
repeated recession was especially harmful in respect to national inequality levels. Secondly, 
economic and social policy of the Chilean government has been improving over time. The neoliberal 
reaction of the government on the crisis of 1972 is evaluated as the most unsuccessful,  followed by 
the programs of 1982 under structural adjustment, and the democratic government after 1990 
(although it did not encountered a crisis of course) is deemed as most successful in providing 
inclusive economic growth.  This is related to the last finding; the presence of both continuity and 
change. The democratic government was successful in changing (mostly intensifying and expanding) 
social policy, but at the same time continued adjustment policies fighting inflation, promoting 
liberalization and reforming the government. This dual policy seems to have accomplished balanced 
economic growth. (Raczynski & Romaguerra, 1995)   
Sheehan’s (1997) comparative research on structural adjustment in Chile, Mexico and Peru provides 
some insights on the influence of different episodes of reform. Based on the available data and 
literarily review he establishes two ‘’jointly valid conclusions’’ about Chile: income inequalities are 
significantly higher at the time of writing than during the ISI economic model and sustained 
economic growth does not seem to have reduced the increased level of inequality. At the same time, 
estimations of inequality levels seem to show that the worsening stopped after the crisis of 1982 and 
even partially reversed, especially after the elected government commenced.  Initially crisis and 
reform caused inequality, but the period of recovery through structural adjustment after 1982 is 
characterized by moderation of the distribution of income.  
Gindling and Robins (2001) their article is an interesting contribution on the literature on Chile 
illustrating this complexity of the nature of structural adjustment. They have employed a quantitative 
research to examine why inequality in Chile increased more rapidly than in Costa Rica during reform. 
They examine the supply, demand and price of both educational facilities and educated labor in the 
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two countries, and find that although educational facilities can improve equity, the price of tuition 
and the differences in the price for low-skilled and high-skilled workers can increase inequality. By 
the latter two factors they explain why the increase in inequality in Chile exceeded the increase in 
Costa Rica. 
5.3 Costa Rica 
Table 3: Overview SAPs Costa Rica 
Year IMF Loans WB Loans 
 (In Thousands of 
SDRs)  
(In millions of US 
$)  
1981 
1982 
1983 
1986 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1994 
1997 
60,50 (SBA) 
276,75 (EFF) 
92,25 (SBA) 
54,00 (SBA) 
40,00 (SBA) 
42,00 (SBA) 
  
33,64 (SBA) 
21,04 (SBA) 
52,00 (SBA) 
 
 
80 (SALP) 
100 (SALP) 
  
  
100 (SALP) 
 
Graph 7: Overview Inflation Costa Rica 
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Graph 8: Overview GDP per capita growth Costa Rica 
  
Graph 9: Overview inequality Costa Rica 
 
Sources:  
GINI Indexes : UNU-WIDER (2015) 
Inflation & GDP growth: The World Bank (2016b) 
IMF Loans: International Monetary Fund (2016) 
WB Loans: The World Bank (2016a) 
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Costa Rica underwent three structural adjustment programs from the World Bank in 1985, 1988 and 
1993 respectively. In addition to this, the IMF facilitated 8 Standby-Arrangements between 1980 and 
1995, and one Extended Fund Facility in 1981. Inequality seems to rise moderately since 1988 or so.     
Most critical literature on the economic history of Costa Rica will point out that at first glance the 
country seems to be a major economic success story in general and for structural adjustment in 
particular. After facing a severe economic crisis in the 1980, Costa Rica reformed its ISIs to an export 
orientated economy, and with help of the IFIs the country curbed inflation and reduced budget 
deficits. Soon the newly export orientated economy was thriving again, and the little Central 
American country that had already set up an extensive and stable welfare state was recognized as 
the most developed country of Latin America in the mid-1990s. (Morley, 1995) Despite these major 
economic advancements, some critical scholars claim that further analysis points out that the 
neoliberal reforms have caused structural problems related to health-care, education, the 
appearance of a class-based society, for example.8  
Morley (1995) however, describes the Costa Rican recovery as successful and economically 
regressive, emphasizing the major reduction of poverty and the decline of inequality between 1981 
and 1989. As opposed to most Latin American countries that kept struggling after the economic 
recession, Costa Rica accomplished significant and inclusive economic growth after this crisis. 
Employing a statistical analysis of socio-economic data, Morley claims that the poorest section of the 
Costa Rican population was one of the groups that benefited the most from the economic expansion 
after 1981. He explains this achievement with two factors. First and foremost, profits from the 
agricultural export increased during this period, and most of the country’s poor were concentrated in 
this sector.  The surge in export in this sector is attributed to export promoting policies and 
devaluation. In addition to this, the Costa Rican government had explicit spending policies to limit the 
impact of the contraction on the poorest. One important remark on the writings of Morley is that it 
only covers the period up until 1989; the period of increasing inequality after 1990 is left out.  
Arias-Ramirez (2004) coined the term ‘’heterodox adjustment’’ in his dissertation on SAPs and social 
policy in Costa Rica. He describes the reforms as more incremental and socially balanced then in 
other Latin American countries that employed policies more related to ‘’shock therapy’’. Balanced 
and inclusive growth, and channels of negotiations for stakeholders in this pluralist political 
democracy contributed to this achievement according to Arias-Ramirez. Three specific factors are 
highlighted in this respect. First, strong labor unions demanded negotiations concerning privatization, 
employment and wages. Second, strong links between state and industrial bourgeoisie guaranteed 
                                                          
8
 See for example the popular article of Hansen-Kuhn (1993) and the dissertation of Lubiner (2006).  
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incremental liberalization so that national industries could adapt to the competiveness of the 
international market.  Third, the unstable political situation in the rest of Central America ensured 
that Costa Rica had a ‘’preferential treatment’’ by the US as a liberal democratic state in an 
authoritarian/communist region.  
5.4 Venezuela  
Table 4: Overview SAPs Venezuela 
Year IMF Loans WB Loans 
 (In Thousands of 
SDRs)  
(In millions of US 
$)  
1980 
1982 
1989 
 
3857,10 (EFF)  
350,00  (SBA) 
402 (SALP)  
  
  
 
 
Graph 9: Overview Inflation Venezuela 
 
  
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998
Inflation 
 
 
 
Inflation,
consumer
prices
(annual %)
21 
 
Graph 10: Overview GDP per capita growth Costa Rica 
  
Graph 11: Overview GINI Index growth Costa Rica 
 
Sources: 
GINI: UNU-WIDER (2015) 
Inflation & GDP growth: The World Bank (2016b) 
IMF Loans: International Monetary Fund (2016) 
WB Loans: The World Bank (2016a) 
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In Venezuela SAPs were smaller in numbers. The World Bank had only one Structural Adjustment 
Loan Project in the country that started in 1989 and the IMF provided only one EFF in 1989 and one 
SBA in 1996. The data shows that inequality increased significantly in this period.  
Morley (1995) describes how the Venezuelan economy was marked by a terrible contraction in the 
1980s. Growth stagnated as opposed to exceptional good fortune in the 1970s, poverty amongst the 
population increased despite the presence of abundant natural resources (mostly oil), the political 
system deteriorated and inequality skyrocketed. In the decades preceding the economic recession, 
Venezuela’s economic figures were rising parallel to the growing oil prices, but the country never 
developed an alternative economy that could sustain itself if the prices would drop. When they did in 
1982, Venezuela started a painful process of adjustment, of which Morley identifies (1995) 3 phases. 
From 1983 to 1986, government budget cuts and real devaluation continued the recession. Morley 
describes this as ‘’adjustment without structural change’’, as the contraction was not accompanied 
by any structural measures in changing the statist economy. Between 1986 and 1988, a new social 
democratic government reversed previous policies and tried to boost the economy through debt 
financed growth. Increased spending and (re)implementation of social policies lead to economic 
growth, but at the cost of increasing budget deficits and growing inflation. Policies were again 
reversed by a new government in 1989 when another major contraction due to unsustainable 
external debt occurred, and loans of the IFIs were coupled with structural changes. Deficits were 
reduces and price controls were abolished, but inflation rates had already risen to 84 percent and 
GDP had fell by almost 9 percent. Although Morley states this was one of the most dramatic 
recessions of Latin America at the time, after this contraction per capita income was raised 
significantly and inflation and poverty rates dropped tremendously.   
During structural adjustment, the rates of poverty and inequality increased. However, the exact 
nature and perceived causes of this inequality are more complex than this correlation might imply. 
Morley (1995) explains how, although austerity measures had severe social effects on the population, 
the effects of structural adjustment might be more evenly dispersed then one might expect on the 
basis of just the rising GINI coefficient. His analysis of the social consequences of various groups in 
Venezuelan society points out that the effects of reform were quite evenly dispersed. Aside from the 
retention of the incomes at the highest levels as opposed to the rest of the population, Morley 
findings state that the influence of structural adjustment policies on social inequality were limited. 
He claims that poorly designed policies during and before the recession, preceding the SAPs, were 
the major cause of the socio-economic grievances in the 1980s. Furthermore, inequality levels in 
Venezuela started dropping slowly again after the recession.  
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Marquez (1995) states that social spending is one of the main factors influencing the distribution of 
income and poverty in his description of the poverty and social policies in this period in Venezuela. 
Public social spending drives the growth of human capital through schooling and health care, and as 
wages can be seen as the return of human capital, equality of opportunity through social spending 
promotes equality of economic outcome. He describes how the majority of the budget cuts that 
decreased investment in human capital in Venezuela were implemented following the recession of 
1982, before the introduction of SAPs. Marquez finds that when these policies were swapped with 
programs of the IFIs, more attention was directed to investment in education. As such, Marquez 
concludes that the unilateral reforms following 1982 were primarily responsible for decreasing 
development of human capital.  
The findings of Lander and Fierro (1996) in their article explaining the impact of neoliberal 
adjustment in Venezuela oppose those of Morley and Marquez. These authors stress that the 
increase of economic inequality was far more severe after 1989 then before, and that the efforts of 
to redirect social policies towards the poor, the most vulnerable sectors and the directly affected 
were only partially effective. At the same time, privatization of state enterprises mostly benefited the 
rich and wealth and income concentrated at the top. Decreased conditions of consumption, living 
and health followed for the lower sectors of society.   
6. Interpretation of the research  
6.1. Testing the hypotheses 
To answer the research question, the six subhypotheses will be tested on the basis of the findings in 
the reviewed literature. The general hypothesis will be examined subsequently.  
- 1. Currency devaluation implemented through SAPs increases inequality. Currency 
devaluation seems to play a significant role in the development of inequality in these cases. 
One of the reasons Thiele (2003) mentioned which explains the rising levels of inequality in 
Bolivia after SAPs where implemented is the moderate success of devaluating the currency. 
As this was not accomplished as properly as in other countries, the Bolivian agricultural 
sector became competitively disadvantaged. In sectors that proved to uphold their 
competitiveness despite these conditions like mining and manufacturing, incomes did 
increase, thereby increasing economic inequality. In Costa Rica however, real devaluation 
was accomplished. Along with other export promoting policies, Morley (1995) identifies 
devaluation as an import factor promoting agricultural exports. Both the production of 
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traditional and new agricultural products increased in the period following adjustment as 
these products could be exported very profitable. The poor of Costa Rica were primarily 
concentrated in this rural, agricultural sector, and this increase in production and profit 
benefited this part of the population immensely. This leveled the distribution of income. 
Although these are the only two occasions that devaluation is mentioned in the literature 
examined, in both cases it is identified as a factor that (potentially) can decrease inequality. 
Thereby, hypothesis 1 is rejected.    
- 2. Austerity implemented through SAPs increases inequality. Austerity, or the lack of it, seems 
to be a major force influencing inequality. Mentioned in all of these cases examined, cuts in 
spending on social programs and investments in human capital are identified as one of the 
most important factors influencing inequality. Thiele (2003) states that the exceptional fact 
that Bolivia increased its social budget during reform was a factor that countered other 
processes increasing inequality. Spending in health-care and public investment remained 
stable, and spending in education even increased. These sectors are identified as crucial to 
promoting social mobility and equality. In Chile, initial (unilateral) reforms following the crisis 
of 1972 are evaluated by Raczynski and Romaguerra (1995) as both unsuccessful in 
promoting sustainable economic growth and the cause of a major increase in inequality. 
Severe austerity in order to reduce the government deficit was a substantial part of these 
reforms. Morley (1995) identifies government policies in Costa Rica that were explicitly set 
up to limit the consequences  of crisis, contraction and reform as an import factor in the 
maintenance of a level distribution of income. These policies were set up to limit the 
consequences of austerity on the poorest. Finally, Marquez (1995) states that in Venezuela 
government budget cuts were the most important cause of rising levels of inequality, 
explaining it as the determinant of the growth of human capital. As the development for the 
poor of their own capital is diminished, equality of opportunity decreases, thereby also 
decreasing economic inequality. However, Marquez states that most of these cuts happened 
before 1989, and reform under the auspices of the IFIs after 1990 was more poverty 
orientated. So austerity does seem to be a major cause of inequality in the examined cases.  
However, one has to distinguish necessary austerity implemented due to excessive 
government debt from ill-considered cuts that halter the development of human capital. 
Excessive austerity can partially be contributed to the SAPs, but the case studies show that 
most of the latter forms of cut backs were done independently from the IFIs (Davis Hamel, 
2012)(Marquez, 1995). So although there is a relation between austerity and inequality, 
subhypothesis 2 is rejected.  
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- 3. Growth following structural adjustment is not inclusive, thereby causing inequality. When 
the graphs on economic growth and inequality are compared, we can see in the cases of 
Chile, Costa Rica and Venezuela that (unstable) renewed growth did not decrease levels of 
inequality, and even seem to coincide with an increase. Raczynski and Romaguerra (1995) 
explicitly mention this occurrence in their article on Chile, as they explain how high growth 
alternated by crisis especially hurts the lower classes of society. Recession harms the wealth 
and income of these groups, but economic expansion does not guarantee an opposite 
development. The data in the graphs on growth and inequality seem to confirm this, as the 
contractions mostly resulted in increased inequality, and renewed growth often does not 
prove to be inclusive.  SAPs can be identified as partly responsible for this factor, as renewed 
social spending programs were not included in the programs. In a similar fashion, Morley 
(1995) states that when governments independently set up facilities fighting inequality 
during renewed growth (e.g. Costa Rica) inequality declined, and when these were lacking 
(e.g. Venezuela) inequality remained. As both these authors describe this phenomenon as an 
import factor, subhypothesis 3 is confirmed.  
- 4. Curbed inflation following structural adjustment decreases inequality. Inflation during crisis 
is in many cases identified as a major contributor to rising levels of inequality, and SAPs are 
mainly contributed to curbing inflation. The data presented in the graphs on inflation and the 
overviews of SAPs seem to confirm this, as periods of crisis and high inflation seem to 
coincide roughly with increasing levels of inequality, although the degree of (hyper)inflation 
does not seem to influence changing inequality proportionately. As for the literature, Thiele 
(2003) credits the structural adjustment reforms in Bolivia that curbed hyperinflation as one 
of the most important measures during the first stage of reform. This facilitated a slow 
recovery of renewed economic growth and caused a trend towards a more equitable income 
distribution. Morley (1995) states that a fast decrease in inflation due to reform enabled 
Costa Rica to make a quick economic recovery, and halted increasing inequality.  However, 
Morley also states in his chapter on Venezuela that the increase of inflation during SAPs in 
1989 (following the period of debt financed growth) was a major shortcoming of the reforms. 
In his view (in 1995) this is compensated by growth and poverty alleviation after this period, 
but this inflation would eventually result in hyperinflation during a crisis in 1998. There is not 
much literature on the question whether SAPs in 1989 failed to prevent this following crisis, 
further research on this case in needed. Although this anomaly in Venezuela is notable, 
hypothesis 4 is confirmed as multiple authors have identified this mechanism in multiple 
cases. 
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- 5. Trade liberalization implemented through SAPs can both increase and decrease inequality. 
Depending on the competiveness of the domestic industries, trade liberalization can have 
both an increasing and decreasing effect on economic inequality. In Bolivia, Thiele (2003) 
states that the agricultural sector was not competitive in the region and did not take off like 
it did in other countries. In addition, the increase in income of white-collar workers has 
exceeded that of blue-collar workers and those working in the informal sector. Although 
Thiele states that the exact relationship between reform and this development remains 
unclear, he explains it might be related to the implementation of structural adjustment as 
liberalized enterprises developed to become a larger share of the economy, and white-collar 
workers in this sector have increased their numbers and their individual incomes. These two 
processes caused by trade liberalization are perceived to have increased inequality. Gindling 
and Robins (2001) find that in Chile falling tariffs accelerated imports of physical capital and 
promoted technological development based on skill. The new industries that needed this 
capital and skilled labor caused a domestic demand for educated workers. This increased the 
‘’returns of education’’, or the difference between the price for highly and poorly educated 
labor. Although the level of education of the average Chilean rose in this period, difference in 
wages between workers increased, as did inequality. As such, Gindling and Robins find that 
liberalization worsened the distribution of increased inequality. As mentioned before, 
expansion of the agricultural sector was a major factor in the decrease of inequality in Costa 
Rica. Next to devaluation, export promoting policies like trade liberalization were a key factor 
contributing to this process, which enabled Costa Rica to reduce inequality and expand its 
welfare state (Morley, 1995). Although in the majority of these cases trade liberalization 
seems to have had a negative influence on inequality, it appears that it also has the potential 
to level the distribution of income. As such, subhypothesis 5 is confirmed.  
- 6. Financial liberalization implemented through SAPs increases inequality. Financial 
liberalization is identified by Lander and Fierro (1996) as a cause of concentration of wealth 
and income at the elite of the society in Venezuela. In the liberalized financial markets the 
elite was able to increase their ownership of previously state-owned industries through the 
acquisition of stocks and bonds.  These assets were cheap due to the crisis, but as some of 
these holdings increased tremendously in value in time in the newly liberalized economy, a 
relatively small number of people benefitted disproportionally. Although this observation is 
notable, it was the only source wherein financial liberalization was mentioned as a factor 
increasing inequality. Due to this lack of recurrence in other sources on Venezuela or other 
cases, subhypothesis 6 is rejected.  
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Based on these results, in this research the general hypothesis ‘’SAPs have been a major factor 
causing the increase of inequality in Latin America’’ is rejected. Although through some policies SAPs 
might have increased inequality, this research shows that due to multiple mechanisms SAPs influence 
inequality in various, sometimes counteracting ways.  
6.2 Alternative explanations 
The review of the literature on the cases provided some other factors that were not identified in the 
theoretical framework. Although these findings do not provide further insight on the relationship 
between SAPs and inequality, they will be presented concisely in order to get a comprehensive image 
on the causes of inequality in Latin America and as an outline for further research on the 
phenomenon.    
Poor economic policy prior to adjustment is one of the factors mentioned most frequently in relation 
to economic inequality. Many authors9 state explicitly that the economic recession caused by the ISI 
based autarkic economies was the most important factor that increased inequality, and that these 
ISIs inevitably lead to the systemic crises of the 1980s. The data on inequality and growht of Chile and 
Costa Rica (Bolivia and Venezuela have too many missing values) confirm this as every economic 
contraction comes together with a steep increase in the GINI index.  This differs from the smaller 
changes, both positive and negative, during the years of reform. Even more so, the austerity 
measures examined through subhypothesis 2 are also the indirect consequences of these flawed 
policies which caused economic crisis in the early 1980s. When one identifies budget cuts, whether 
or not as a part of SAPs, as a contributor to inequality, both post-crisis austerity and the pre-crisis 
policies that caused the need for this measure are partly responsible for the outcome. In addition to 
this, post-crisis policies conducted without the assistance of the IFIs seem to have a worse record 
than the SAPs. In the case of Chile, both Raczynski and Romaguerra (1995) and Davis-Hamel (2012) 
state that the initial, unilateral reforms of the Pinochet governments following the crisis of 1972 had 
the greatest impact on economic inequality, and also failed to bring sustained economic growth. 
Morley (1995) describes how the contraction caused by austerity of the Venezuelan government 
following the crisis of 1982 was not accompanied by any structural changes in the statist economy. 
Although the population endured falling standards of living, no economic progress was made. When 
policies were reversed in 1986, debt financed growth still did not bring any sustainable solutions. It 
was not until a second crisis led to economic assistance from the IMF, and structural problems were 
                                                          
9
 e.g.Morley (1995), Sheahan (1997) & Thiele (2003),  
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addressed. Economists in the capitals of Latin America sometimes seem to be more responsible for 
poor economics in the region then those in Washington.  
Another factor which is identified as influencing the development of inequality is the policy on 
education. Multiple authors identify accessibility and quality of education as the most important 
factor influencing inequality. Vargas (2012) states that within the social budget long-term 
improvements of education specifically have contributed more than anything else to the reduction of 
inequality in Bolivia since 2000, and that sources of inequality can mostly be attributed to differences 
in human capital, on which accessible education has a leveling effect. Morley (1995) also describes 
how Costa Rica’s traditionally high budget on education and the preservation of this policy during 
contraction contributed to moderate the effects of the economic crisis that increased inequality. 
Lastly, in his elaboration on the influence of public spending on inequality, Marquez (1995) also 
states that the development of human capital through education among other things is the main 
promoter of equality of opportunity and economic equity.           
And finally, the adaptation of reforms to local circumstances and interest is perceived as a factor 
influencing inequality. If a ‘’bottom-up’’ approach is used to reform, wherein local stakeholders are 
consulted, economic adjustment can be more balanced and successful. Arias-Ramirez (2004) 
identifies this as a key element explaining why reform in Costa Rica was successful. Rather than 
implementing reforms ‘’top-down’’ and at a high pace, withholding crucial stakeholders time to 
adapt to change, representatives of labor, capital and other interest were consulted and their 
concerns were taken into account. This smoothed the process of adjustment, and prevented an 
excessive rise in inequality. This seems to be in line with the description of Raczynski & Romaguerra 
(1995) of the improvement of economic policies in Chile over time. As opposed to the unilateral 
reforms of the Pinochet regime, the most successful reforms of the democratic government several 
years later was characterized by adjustment balanced with social policies based on local interests. 
Although the case of Costa Rica can be lauded as a success of structural adjustment, this success also 
entails that the lack of involvement of local interest in other Latin American countries under SAPs 
precluded these other countries from establishing this sort of economic success. So in the rest of 
Latin America, the lack of this aspect can be seen as a shortcoming of SAPs.  
Next to these factors that were (repeatedly) identified as major factors, other factors such as 
geopolitical relations (predominately towards the USA) were mentioned in the case of Costa Rica 
(Morley, 1995), failure of proper implementation in the case of Bolivia (Thiele, 2003) and the size of 
the informal sector of the economy in Venezuela (Morley, 1995) were described as significant in 
influencing inequality in the region.  
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6.3 Conclusion  
As the general hypothesis of this dissertation has been rejected and these various alternative factors 
influencing the distributions of income in Latin America have been identified, it appears that SAPs 
cannot be held solely responsible for increasing levels of inequality in these cases, and thereby in 
Latin America in general. As there were hardly any authors that explained the rise of inequality in a 
country primarily as the result of SAPs, some consequences of SAPs might have decreased inequality, 
and authors have identified various other causes, this research concludes that Structural Adjustment 
Programs are not identified as the primary cause of economic inequality in conducted case studies in 
Latin America. The causes of the economic inequality that continue to plague this region cannot 
simply be related to these programs designed by the IFIs. With these findings this paper aims to 
contribute to a nuanced image of structural adjustment and inequality in the complex research on 
political economy.  
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Dataset World Bank: 
Series Name 
Inflation, 
consumer 
prices 
(annual %) 
Inflation, 
consumer 
prices 
(annual %) 
Inflation, 
consumer 
prices 
(annual %) 
Inflation, 
consumer 
prices 
(annual %) 
Country 
Name Bolivia Chile Costa Rica Venezuela, RB 
Country 
Code BOL CHL CRI VEN 
1973 31,48603 352,828 15,21403 4,12631 
1974 62,83608 504,7339 30,07363 8,287462 
1975 7,976746 374,7354 17,3692 10,24428 
1976 4,494012 211,9244 3,485833 7,601665 
1977 8,107256 91,95414 4,174484 7,802643 
1978 10,35567 40,08722 6,014671 7,114595 
1979 19,71972 33,38921 9,18351 12,35461 
1980 47,24165 35,13834 18,12639 21,54107 
1981 32,1336 19,68684 37,0572 16,04997 
1982 123,5357 9,941021 90,12271 9,660668 
1983 275,5863 27,2572 32,62056 6,338049 
1984 1281,35 19,86021 11,95066 11,57286 
1985 11749,64 30,70349 15,05176 11,38238 
1986 276,336 19,47687 11,83675 11,54335 
1987 14,5787 19,88081 16,84665 28,13548 
1988 16,00209 14,68436 20,82632 29,46873 
1989 15,17347 17,02794 16,50995 84,46331 
1990 17,11877 26,03648 19,04418 40,65575 
1991 21,44707 21,78442 28,70932 34,2054 
1992 12,06032 15,4258 21,78825 31,42263 
1993 8,527877 12,72776 9,781446 38,12162 
1994 7,874044 11,44312 13,53425 60,82101 
1995 10,19321 8,232634 23,18924 59,9191 
1996 12,42549 7,359115 17,52249 99,87714 
1997 4,708444 6,133867 13,23147 50,03907 
1998 7,673229 5,110244 11,66609 35,78202 
1999 2,159516 3,336883 10,04588 23,56989 
2000 4,60823 3,843273 10,99252 16,20481 
 
 3,336883 10,04588 23,56989 
    3,843273 10,99252 16,20481 
    
 
 
 
 
Series Name 
GDP per capita 
growth (annual %) 
GDP per capita 
growth (annual %) 
GDP per capita 
growth (annual %) 
GDP per capita 
growth (annual %) 
Country 
Name Chile Costa Rica Bolivia Venezuela, RB 
Country 
Code CHL CRI BOL VEN 
 1973 -6,55082 5,080827 3,526323 4,138834 
 1974 0,817805 2,973534 0,762773 -0,73536 
 1975 -12,7707 -0,42297 5,016964 0,070186 
 1976 1,807577 2,865172 2,355187 4,762658 
 1977 7,057915 6,130471 2,687861 3,347331 
 1978 5,871135 3,527891 -0,17217 -0,45831 
 1979 7,08896 2,207974 -2,0418 -1,9742 
 1980 6,568476 -1,88785 -3,4971 -6,9888 
 1981 3,210885 -4,8431 -1,86673 -3,00443 
 1982 -11,6305 -9,75078 -5,97329 -4,63689 
 1983 -5,20348 0,13173 -6,05107 -6,26344 
 1984 6,348951 3,413071 -2,25942 -1,17714 
 1985 5,463427 -1,56616 -3,67165 -2,38348 
 1986 3,917456 3,112743 -4,51604 3,780855 
 1987 4,861732 4,225037 0,453069 0,945685 
 1988 5,547338 1,268615 0,910705 3,165297 
 1989 8,747514 2,476646 1,779195 -10,8138 
 1990 2,019072 1,319338 2,602972 3,928738 
 1991 6,249041 -0,00106 3,215017 7,191819 
 1992 10,5161 6,410736 -0,33717 3,678009 
 1993 5,342251 4,727796 2,231952 -1,91518 
 1994 4,126253 2,140567 2,621004 -4,42961 
 1995 9,02212 1,398053 2,632886 1,787882 
 1996 5,906049 -1,52029 2,323065 -2,22718 
 1997 5,15888 3,112925 2,908492 4,259021 
 1998 1,872912 5,962401 2,995873 -1,65401 
 1999 -2,03194 5,934553 -1,49327 -7,76163 
 2000 3,187714 -0,18893 0,580428 1,74665 
 
 
       
  
 
 
Dataset UNU-WIDER: 
Country Countrycode Year Gini Source 
Bolivia BOL 1992 56 SEDLAC,2012 
Bolivia BOL 1993 58 SEDLAC,2012 
Bolivia BOL 1993 - SEDLAC,2012 
Bolivia BOL 1997 53 SEDLAC,2012 
Bolivia BOL 1997 - SEDLAC,2012 
Bolivia BOL 1997 56 SEDLAC,2012 
Bolivia BOL 1997 - SEDLAC,2012 
Bolivia BOL 1999 54 SEDLAC,2012 
Bolivia BOL 1999 55 SEDLAC,2012 
Bolivia BOL 2000 - SEDLAC,2012 
Bolivia BOL 2001 54 SEDLAC,2012 
Bolivia BOL 2001 55 SEDLAC,2012 
Bolivia BOL 2002 54 SEDLAC,2012 
Bolivia BOL 2002 53 SEDLAC,2012 
Bolivia BOL 2003 54 SEDLAC,2012 
Bolivia BOL 2005 54 SEDLAC,2012 
Bolivia BOL 2005 54 SEDLAC,2012 
Bolivia BOL 2006 54 SEDLAC,2012 
Bolivia BOL 2006 53 SEDLAC,2012 
Bolivia BOL 2007 51 SEDLAC,2012 
Bolivia BOL 2007 51 SEDLAC,2012 
Bolivia BOL 2008 42 SEDLAC,2012 
Chile CHL 1987 42 SEDLAC,2012 
Chile CHL 1990 43 SEDLAC,2012 
Chile CHL 1992 43 SEDLAC,2012 
Chile CHL 1994 43 SEDLAC,2012 
Chile CHL 1996 44 SEDLAC,2012 
Chile CHL 1998 43 SEDLAC,2012 
Chile CHL 2000 44 SEDLAC,2012 
Chile CHL 2003 43 SEDLAC,2012 
Chile CHL 2006 43 SEDLAC,2012 
Chile CHL 2009 45 SEDLAC,2012 
Costa Rica CRI 1989 44 SEDLAC,2012 
Costa Rica CRI 1990 48 SEDLAC,2012 
Costa Rica CRI 1991 48 SEDLAC,2012 
Costa Rica CRI 1992 47 SEDLAC,2012 
Costa Rica CRI 1993 46 SEDLAC,2012 
Costa Rica CRI 1994 45 SEDLAC,2012 
Costa Rica CRI 1995 47 SEDLAC,2012 
Costa Rica CRI 1996 47 SEDLAC,2012 
Costa Rica CRI 1997 47 SEDLAC,2012 
Costa Rica CRI 1998 48 SEDLAC,2012 
Costa Rica CRI 1999 46 SEDLAC,2012 
 
 
Costa Rica CRI 2000 40 SEDLAC,2012 
Costa Rica CRI 2001 39 SEDLAC,2012 
Costa Rica CRI 2002 44 SEDLAC,2012 
Costa Rica CRI 2003 46 SEDLAC,2012 
Costa Rica CRI 2004 45 SEDLAC,2012 
Costa Rica CRI 2005 45 SEDLAC,2012 
Costa Rica CRI 2006 42 SEDLAC,2012 
Costa Rica CRI 2007 44 SEDLAC,2012 
Costa Rica CRI 2008 45 SEDLAC,2012 
Costa Rica CRI 2009 44 SEDLAC,2012 
Costa Rica CRI 2010 43 SEDLAC,2012 
Venezuela VEN 1989 45 SEDLAC,2012 
Venezuela VEN 1992 41 SEDLAC,2012 
Venezuela VEN 1995 39 SEDLAC,2012 
Venezuela VEN 1997 38 SEDLAC,2012 
Venezuela VEN 1998 36 SEDLAC,2012 
 
